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Review Article 
Assessing National Parliaments after the Euro Crisis: Resignation, Adaptation, and 
Reaction 
 
Marco Goldoni (Glasgow University) 
 
The academic interest for national parliaments (NPs) has not suffered from fatigue. To the 
contrary, academic research has become more and more sophisticated and, by now, has 
addressed a number of important issues concerning NPs. For a long time, research on the 
role (mostly legisprudential, but not limited to that) of NPs in the EU has been driven by two 
fundamental questions: how much can national parliaments affect EU policymaking and 
lawmaking and how much can they be Europeanised without losing the specificity of their 
own national functions? Yet, the Euro-crisis (one among many which have plagued the EU 
and its Member States in recent years), has reverted the question: how much 
Europeanisation can national parliaments endure before their capacity for autonomous 
political decision-making will be reduced to a minimum? The three volumes1 examined in 
this review article are driven mostly by the question posed by the subtitle of Maatsch’s 
book: are national parliaments, in the context of the new Euro governance, still deliberative 
bodies or have they been reduced to talking shops? A variation of this question constitutes 
the subtitle of Jancic’s edited volume as well: are we facing a case of resilience or 
resignation? The question is obviously and immediately relevant for the legitimacy and the 
functioning of both the EU and the national systems. The reason for the academic interest 
generated around national parliaments has to be seen in the common intuition that, among 
all European institutions, national parliaments are those that in virtue of (1) their own 
position and composition and (2) their own institutional preferences, are better positioned 
(at least within the EU) to subtract political action from the overdetermination of economic 
or financial forces. National parliaments remain the closer institutions to electoral 
constituencies and MPs are often constrained by the imperatives of being re-elected. The 
widespread assumption behind this is that national parliaments do have in-built incentives 
to be sensitive toward claims coming from society and less prone to serve as vectors of 
economic interests. In other words, NPs are the institutional channel whose politics is less 
prone to be coopted by non-political forces.  
One should add that the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, often defined as the Treaty of the 
Parliaments because it increased the number of parliamentary rights and competences 
(both of NPs and the European Parliament), seemed to open a new epoch of activism for 
parliamentary institutions in the EU. As Jancic appropriately sums up in the introductory 
chapter of his edited collection, ‘the key post-Lisbon prerogatives […] are to receive 
information on draft EU legislation and third-country applications for EU membership, to 
police the principle of subsidiarity, to monitor Europol’s and Eurojust’s activities, to 
participate in the revision of the Treaties, and to build tighter relations with the EP’ (Jancic, 
p. 6). This list partially explains why in many disciplines the topic of the role of parliaments 
had taken up a new impetus. Unfortunately, the Treaty entered into force just before the 
                                                     
1 The three volumes are: D. Jancic (ed), National Parliaments after the Lisbon Treaty and the Euro Crisis, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2017 (hereafter: Jancic in parenthesis in the text); A. Maatsch, Parliaments and the 
Economic Governance of the European Union, Routledge, Abingdon, 2017; T. Winzen, Constitutional 
Preferences and Parliamentary Reform: Explaining National Parliaments’ Adaptation to European Integration, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2017 (hereafter: Winzen) 
inception of the Euro crisis and in the period between 2010 and 2012, several measures (at 
times approved via emergency or unconventional channels)2 were introduced, with the 
formal consent of parliaments, despite the fact that these same measures seemed to 
undercut parliaments’ potential for genuine political decision-making. In addressing these 
problems, these three volumes show beyond any reasonable doubt that the community of 
research which have developed and flourished in the last decade around the study of 
national parliaments is ready to address them with a rich array of methodologies.3 Overall, 
the three volumes offer an enriching interpretation of the current transformation of 
national parliaments in the EU. 
 
National Parliaments Facing the Euro-Crisis 
 
In the last decade, the crisis and the ensuing array of new political and legal measures have 
undoubtedly changed the constitutional balance within the EU.4 Unavoidably, the new 
economic governance has put the position of (at least some) national parliaments under a 
lot of political and constitutional stress. In hindsight, it is impressive to observe how quickly 
the position of parliaments has substantially changed: from potential new protagonists of 
EU lawmaking (through subsidiarity review and the political dialogue) to (once again) victims 
of the new regime of European lawmaking, which has been properly defined as ‘new 
intergovernmentalism’.5 While the Early Warning Mechanism for reviewing subsidiarity 
elicited a lot of interest in the first few years of its application as the main opportunity for 
involving national parliaments in the production of EU law, the new circumstances created 
by the multiple crises affecting the EU have clearly pushed research toward different 
directions. The interest seems now to be moving from participation into ordinary lawmaking 
to new forms of engagement with institutions well beyond the European Parliament and the 
Commission. In light of this consideration, the structure of the collection edited by Jancic 
strikes as appropriate. The first part is dedicated to the theory and history of national 
parliaments in European constitutionalism and contains chapters from some of the most 
prominent and original authors of the field (Besselink, Lindseth, Fasone and Lupo, Smith and 
Barrett), touching upon the issues of democratic or mediated legitimacy, the relation with 
judicial power and constitutional review or the impact of comitology and the Open Method 
of Coordination. Through this series of chapters we are offered an analytical overview on 
many levels of the complex relation between national parliaments and EU institutions. But it 
is with Part II and Part III that the volume takes up directly the challenge represented by 
what is defined by the editor as the ‘crisis incentive’.  
Part II is focussed on the impact of the new economic governance on national parliaments. 
What emerges out of the five chapters comprising this part is a new set of priorities for 
                                                     
2 For a reconstruction of the use of emergency powers as a tool for change see J. White, ‘Emergency Europe’, 
Political Studies, 2(63), 2015, 300-318. 
3 For an assessment of the state of the research on NPs, see the recent overview of the literature concerning 
the role of NPs in the EU see B. Crum, ‘National Parliaments and Constitutional Transformation in the EU’, 
European Constitutional Law Review, 4(13), 2017, pp. 817-835. The state of the art is now represented by the 
following encompassing research handbook: C. Neuhold, O. Rozenberg, J. Smith, C. Hefftler (eds), The Palgrave 
Handbook of National Parliaments and the EU, Palgrave, London, 2015. 
4 For an illuminating analysis see F. de Witte, M. Dawson, ‘The Constitutional Balance of the Eu after’, Modern 
Law Review, 5(76), 2013, pp. 817-844. 
5 On the rise of the new intergovernmentalism see U. Puetter, The European Council and the Council, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2014. 
national parliaments. In his contribution, Ingolf Pernice provides an overview of the 
transformation of the economic governance and its impact upon notions of dialogue and 
cooperation among European institutions. Pernice shows how parliaments have been 
resigned to accept and often adopt new measures during the crisis which would deprive 
them of substantial capacity for action in the future. But he also remarks that some of these 
provisions, in particular the European Semester and the economic dialogue, might push 
national parliaments to take into account European aspects in their decisions and inject 
parliamentary legitimacy into forms of cooperation. His evaluation is that the jury is still out 
on the autonomy left to national parliaments because the latter can still find venues to 
remedy or contain the dominant new intergovernamentalism. A precious oversight of the 
accountability of the European Council and the Council is offered by Diane Fromage. She 
reviews the ability of the NPs of the five biggest Member States (UK, France, Germany, Italy, 
and Spain) to influence and hold their governments to account for their action in the 
European Council and the Council. Her analysis shows that over the years of the crisis, and 
bearing in mind that transparency and accountability are more problematic in the European 
Council rather than in the Council, political accountability of executive powers has become 
tighter in France, Italy, and Spain, while the UK and Germany have constantly ensured a 
flow of information to their parliaments. Fromage gives a relatively optimistic and at the 
same time realistic judgment on the performance of these parliamentary chambers. 
Realistic because it takes into consideration both the limits of the mandate-based system of 
political accountability, as a strict implementation would constrain the leverage for 
bargaining of the executive or move the decisionmaking process in informal arenas, and the 
difficulties of using extreme remedies (in particular, to remove the confidence to the 
government). Optimistic because, despite the shortage of sanctions in the hands of NPs, it 
finds them engaged in functioning as a transmission belt between its constituencies and the 
political intentions of the executive. Part and parcel of this effort is the attempt of striking a 
right balance between the communication function of parliamentary politics, mostly 
obtained in plenary sessions, and the scrutiny function, which is delegated to specialised 
committees.6  
Frank Wendler’s analysis expands on the latter point and it aims at showing that the 
management of the Eurozone crisis has modified rather than simply reduced the role of 
parliamentary politics. Wendler formalises this change by noting that ‘while the 
government-related involvement of parliaments as scrutinizers and policy-making actors 
may have come under pressure, NPs have assumed a stronger citizen-related role as 
institutions representing political actors with dissenting views on the resolution of the crisis, 
and as arenas of public deliberation between these actors’ (Jancic, p. 177). The chapter 
scrutinises three case studies (France, Germany and Austria) with particular attention to the 
form, structure and scope of plenary debates. Wendler’s findings confirm Fromage’s 
analysis because they show an increased debating activity in NPs. These three parliaments, 
although with different modalities (allowing for example, different spaces and timing to the 
parliamentary opposition) have served as arenas for structuring and organising the 
interaction between political actors such as government, parliamentary majorities and 
opposition parties.  
Alexandra Maatsch takes up the question of compliance with the European Semester by NPs 
by assuming that this is intrinsically difficult as their institutional design ‘does not allow 
                                                     
6 Fromage highlights in particular the special effort made by the Spanish parliament. 
them to deal with the negative externalities of their national policies effectively’ (Jancic, p. 
194). Briefly put, NPs do not have a strong incentive to comply with the European Semester 
because they are accountable to national constituencies and, accordingly, they struggle for 
explaining why they should take potential externalities into account. Maatsch has observed 
two parliamentary cycles of the European Semester (2014 and 2015), in Austria, France, 
Germany, and Ireland. But her analysis avoids the abstract reference to NPs and it revolves 
around the behaviour of parliamentary parties. The findings show that compliance with the 
European Semester is more likely when the political preferences of the parliamentary 
majority align with the recommendations of the Commission, while it is less likely when 
these preferences do not align and parliament has strong formal powers in budgetary and 
EU issues.  
In an important chapter, Jancic addresses the crucial question of the political accountability 
of the European Central Bank. Given the role played by the ECB during and after the Euro 
emergency, the importance of this issue cannot be underestimated. Jancic compares the 
accountability of the ECB with that of the Japanese and the US central banks (based on 
legislation) and highlights its special contribution to the management of the Euro-crisis on a 
number of different levels. The activism of the ECB – which was undoubtedly the pivotal 
actor in swiftly reassuring markets of the sustainability of the EMU – and its President have 
triggered the concerns of both the European Parliament and many NPs. Concretely, the 
accountability independence of the ECB has been somehow relaxed: communication 
between parliaments and the ECB is augmented (both for monetary policy and prudential 
supervision). In particular, the President of the ECB has appeared in a number of plenary 
and committee sessions of NPs, but in a completely informal way. This activity resembles 
the political dialogue between the Commission and the NPs as initiated by the Barroso 
presidency: ‘Through these practices the ECB is increasing the awareness, publicity and 
understanding of EU monetary policy. This is significant because it establishes a direct 
communication link between the EU’s monetary authority and domestic lawmakers […] 
However, the nature of the dialogue between the ECB and NPs is essentially one of 
exchange of information and not of full-blown political control of the sort maintained 
between parliaments and governments’ (Jancic, p. 154). These remarks qualify the nature of 
the intervention of NPs more in terms of communication function rather than deliberative 
or scrutiny. Such interaction has not been conflictual, but interestingly MPs (Pringle, 
Gauweiler) have at times used the judicial channel in order to challenge the legality of ECB’s 
(or other EU institutions’) behaviour during the crisis. 
 
 
From Institutions to Political Subjects 
 
Comparative research has shown that national parliaments occupy different positions 
within the European Union legal order and, of course, within their own national 
constitutional systems.7 For this reason, there is an increasing awareness that research on 
the roles and functions of NPs cannot but open up the black box of parliament as a formal 
institution in order to look at the substantial dynamics inside it.8 In other words, any analysis 
                                                     
7 See the chapters devoted to each Member State in C. Neuhold, O. Rozenberg, J. Smith, C. Hefftler (eds), The 
Palgrave Handbook of National Parliaments and the EU, cit. 
8 This remark had already been made several years ago by P. Kiiver, The National Parliaments in the EU, 
Kluwer, The Hague, 2006. 
on the role of national parliaments should take into account the political subjects (parties, 
parliamentary groups and parliamentary officials) that animate its activities.  
The volumes by Maatsch and Winzen make an important contribution on this point. Their 
research is interdisciplinary and combines legal analysis with statistical and comparative 
qualitative and quantitative political analysis. One of the peculiarities of the volume is that 
its focus is not only on a comparative review of NPs as single units within the wider 
European Union constitutional order. The approach includes the position of each NP within 
its own constitutional system, the formation of preferences of political parties and the 
power differential among NPs in the EU. Both authors provide precious information for 
confirming or not certain hypotheses concerning the current role of national parliaments. 
Maatsch reconstructs the behaviour, discourses and preferences of political parties during 
the crisis in both creditor Member States and indebted Member States. Her findings are 
troubling for the autonomy of NPs. In particular, the classic cleavage left-right, so central in 
budgetary issues, has not played a pivotal role during the votes on the economic 
governance. In her reading of the NPs behaviour, the dimensions that structured political 
conflicts were two: government versus opposition and pro- versus anti-EU. But in her 
qualitative analysis of parliamentary discourses, Maatsch found that there was not always 
an alignment between discourse and voting, in particular in bailout Member States. The 
latter distinction (together with the economic preferences of the political majority) explains 
also the macro-economic preferences adopted by NPs during the crisis. The autonomous 
political decisionmaking process of some NPs has been severely constrained by economic 
preconditions.  
Winzen’s book tackles with the ways NPs reacted to the new economic governance 
adaptation of NPs to the economic governance but it does so with the support of an 
empirical analysis and in the framework of a wider context which includes the factors of 
adaptability of NPs to European integration. The main thesis of the book is that the quality 
of rights of participation of NPs in EU affairs is usually determined by a series of factors 
among which national constitutional preferences are extremely relevant. Institutional 
structure is obviously important, but Winzen puts forward an argument based on empirical 
research for the importance of the expectations and the political cultures of national parties 
and their representatives. This is basically a call to take the study of parliamentary 
behaviour more seriously. National parliamentary politics in EU affairs is not a matter of 
sheer resignation before a rigid structure, but (as shown by in-depth analysis of the 
available data) it is determined by a number of variables which are deeply contextual.  
Crucial for the determination of NPs’ reaction vis-à-vis changes dictated by integration or 
emergency are, on one hand, the institutional options available to the parliamentarians, 
and, on the other hand, the constitutional preferences of the parties, that is, whether they 
favour a federalist outlook or an intergovernmental one.9 The empirical chapters of this 
study investigates variations of changes in response to the deepening of European 
integration, with specific cases devoted to the development of oversight institutions 
(chapters 4 and 5) and the proposals for giving parliaments a direct European role (chapter 
6). For the purposes of this review, two case studies illustrate the complexity (and relative 
unpredictability) of parliamentary behaviour in the context of the new economic 
governance. The design and the approval of the ESM represents the first one. The findings 
                                                     
9 Strictly related to this distinction is the question whether parties prefer to focus on domestic oversight of EU-
related activities. 
of Winzen show that in this case the reaction of NPs to an intergovernmental Treaty which 
would constrain or limit some of their powers was mostly determined by the level of 
budgetary powers of NPs: in countries where parliaments have strong budgetary powers, 
the parliamentarians fought for acquiring strong rights in the ESM decision-making process 
(e.g., Austria, Germany, Netherlands). The other case is provided by art. 13 of the Fiscal 
Treaty which invites NPs and the EP to establish a joint conference monitoring the process 
of economic and budgetary policy-making. In this case, the differences in budgetary powers 
have not played the key role; rather, the attitude of parliamentarians toward this new 
avenue of interparliamentary cooperation has been partially determined by the domestic 
presence of strong oversight institutions. Such cooperation might indeed distract resources 
from a domestic focus on parliamentary rights in and beyond EU affairs. Winzen’s 
conclusions is two-fold: there is still room for NPs active role in the EU integrated order, as 
shown by the emergence of EU-related oversight institutions in several Members States; on 
the other hand, opportunities have not been used in the same way across the European 
parliamentary spectrum. As the author explains, ‘differences between parliaments are not a 
matter of accident or structural constraints. They result from political elites’ ideas about 
what kind of democratic institutions and procedures the EU needs’ (Winzen, p. 183). 
Existing institutions may work as constraints (as they did for the new economic governance), 
but they are often the outcome or the reflection of domestically consensual constitutional 
preferences. 
Both Maatsch’s and Winzen’s results confirm that a proper understanding of parliamentary 
discourses and voting behaviour cannot but begin with a study of the preferences of 
political parties and the political culture of their members. Even in situations of emergency, 
where another variable is introduced in the picture, these factors remain decisive – 
although they cannot explain everything – for the determination of parliamentary 
behaviour. In other words, the study of the reaction of NPs during the crisis cannot limit 
itself to the analysis of institutional interactions (vertically, with EU institutions, horizontally 
within national institutions or in the dialogue with other NPs).  
 
Building Parliamentary Capacity: Interparliamentary Cooperation 
 
Part III of the volume edited by Jancic highlights the strategic importance of 
interparliamentary cooperation in different ambits.10 In the chapters of this part, 
interparliamentary cooperation is read as a sign of resilience of the NPs. Cooper frames the 
forms and structures of current interparliamentary cooperation in terms of an emerging 
order. He recognises the tensions and conflicts that affect interparliamentary cooperation 
bodies but he identifies three emerging trends with ordering properties. The first trend is 
the functional drive of each interparliamentary cooperation forum. The CFSP-CDSP and the 
SECG conferences have been created as functionally specialised body and the incipient 
oversight mechanism for the political monitoring of Europol is inspired by the same logic. 
The second trend concerns how these new bodies should be organised and this task has 
been taken up by the EU Speakers conference. Finally, a third trend is visible in the logistical 
arrangements of these interparliamentary conferences, which has been managed by the 
rotating Presidency Parliament. These three trends counteract the inertial tendency toward 
                                                     
10 For an extended analysis of interparliamentary cooperation see N. Lupo, C. Fasone (eds), Interparliamentary 
Cooperation in the EU Composite Constitution, Hart, Oxford, 2016. 
a disordered interaction in the history of interparliamentary cooperation and indicate, 
according to Cooper, a growing awareness of its importance among NPs. The other key area 
where policies of the EU are steadily increasing concerns the external powers.  
In an exhaustive assessment, Kolja Raube and Jan Wouters cover three key segments of EU 
external action: Common Security and Foreign Policy, trade policies and human rights. In 
these three fields, NPs’ resources and actions varied greatly from parliament to parliament. 
But despite an initial resignation to inaction, Raube and Wouters find that there has been an 
increasing organised reaction, at least when resources are available, from many NPs. For 
example, the rise of concerns for the ratification of complex and controversial free trade 
agreements has pushed several NPs to become more assertive and to push for the 
recognition of the agreements as a mixed agreement, so to be able to have a say on its final 
ratification. Venues for interparliamentary cooperation are less developed on these issues 
and, for trade policies and human rights, only COSAC has served at times as a site of 
cooperation and exchange of information. While the authors highlight the general 
strengthening of interparliamentary cooperation they also stress that it ‘does at times lack 
the support of parliamentarians themselves, who do not regularly attend meetings or do 
not use the possibility to be represented by larger delegations. Moreover, 
interparliamentary cooperation in EU external relations currently does not go beyond 
networking and information exchange, which underlines its still rather informal character’ 
(Jancic, p. 298).  
In the final chapter of his edited volume, after an analysis of the ‘third yellow card’, Jancic 
suggests two possible avenues for the future involvement of national parliaments in 
European integration. The first one is to strengthen the oversight function of parliaments. 
This move is already underway, but it needs to be enhanced because, as remarked in several 
chapters, it is still far from being able to hold new intergovernmentalism accountable. The 
second, on which he particularly insists, is to enhance the available forms of 
interparliamentary cooperation under the assumption that only meaningful interaction 
among NPs can make any difference at the EU level. This might happen, perhaps, through 
an upgrade of cooperation by merging into a single body all interparliamentary forums (with 
functionally specialised working groups). 
In light of the conclusions advanced by these three volumes, one might put into question 
the capacity of national parliaments to impress a trajectory on (or to influence) European 
integration. One of the observations that emerge by reading these works is that national 
parliaments have adapted to the changes imposed by the multiple crises affecting today’s 
Europe. Resilience and/or adaptation are often mentioned by some authors to describe how 
national parliaments reacted. Yet, on the question whether this adaptation is just passive 
recognition of a state of affairs or it contains the seeds for a renewal of the parliamentary 
role in the EU, the jury is still out. However, it seems that a couple of observations can be 
confirmed. First, parliaments have been affected and have adapted with different degrees 
across the EU; second, they have often been either circumvented or (alternatively) nudged 
by other institutions, that is, they have rarely claimed their own political autonomy. This 
does not bode well for their political potential. In fact, this is reflected in the mixed 
prognoses formulated by the authors and editors of these volumes. Jancic, in the conclusive 
chapter of his edited collection, remarks that ‘Parliaments’ legislative powers have been 
replaced by a mechanism that steers their members away from politics and into the domain 
of technocracy […] this means that resilience in procedural terms has been overshadowed 
by resignation cast by the impotence of NPs to bring influence directly to bear on EU 
policies’ (Jancic, p. 308).  Alexandra Maatsch presents a less pessimist prognosis. She claims 
that the findings of her analysis ‘demonstrate that despite the limitation of formal powers 
and prioritarization of international responsibility among governing parties, national 
parliaments have not become mere talking shops’ (Maatsch, p. 117). Coherently, she shows 
that there is still space for the deliberative qualities of parliaments, provided that 
parliamentary debate is not overcome by emergency politics. Accordingly, the problem with 
the new Euro governance is identified more in the emergency and unconventional 
procedures adopted by EU institutions rather than by its permanent impact: ‘national 
parliaments’ formal powers became restricted by national governments that frequently 
decided to approve anti-crisis measures with fast-track procedures […] in particular, if a fast-
track procedure reduced or eliminated the standard number of plenary debates, 
parliamentary parties were deprived of a necessary institutional framework to fulfil their 
representative and control functions’ (Maatsch, p. 116). Maatsch believes that parliaments 
are capable of a certain degree of institutional flexibility and much of their lasting relevance 
will depend on how they will adapt to the new economic governance. Perhaps, what is at 
stake here is not much the alleged potential flexibility of parliaments, but the framing of the 
new economic governance as exceptional. Yet, it would be possible to read the new 
economic governance in a continuum with the institutional setting created first by the 
Maastricht Treaty and then enhanced by the Lisbon treaty. Winzen’s conclusions are more 
encouraging, as his reconstruction casts a more active light on the role played by NPs in 
European integration. Yet, he also concedes that there are substantial differences among 
NPs and some have performed way better than many others. In the case of the new 
economic governance, it is by no chance that parliaments of creditor States have on average 
been able to negotiate an increase of their parliamentary rights and those of debtor States 
have been less assertive. 
A common assumption which pervades larges sections of research (and political action as 
well) is that the best NPs can obtain at this point in time is a form of adaptation which 
would preserve (under some form) the communicative and scrutiny functions of NPs in EU 
affairs. Executive federalism is taken to be an insurmountable horizon against which NPs can 
only try to adapt. NPs do not represent any longer the forum where political parties form 
their political will and impress it, as governing activity, upon other institutions.  
A recent proposal for reform known as the ‘green card’, initially inspired by the cards 
potentially triggered by subsidiarity review, has elicited some hope for those who wish a 
revival of NPs’ capacity of contributing to the definition of the political trajectory of 
integration. In the volume edited by Jancic, a chapter by Karolina Boronska-Hryniewiecka 
assesses the potential of this new instrument.  The idea was initially formally introduced in a 
COSAC meeting in 2013 and has been subsequently developed by the Danish Folketing and 
the Dutch Tweede Kamer.11 The first trial green card was initiated by the House of Lords on 
the issue of food waste. A letter inviting the Commission to adopt a strategic approach to 
the reduction of food waste within the EU was sent with the signature of 16 out of the 41 
national parliamentary chambers. The Commission responded to the Green Card in 
November of the same year and, when it published its Circular Economy Packaged, it 
included some of the suggestions coming from the NPs. However, the two following try-outs 
                                                     
11 Not all parliaments have expressed their support. In fact, three chambers have made visible their 
opposition: the Finnish Eduskunta, the Italian Camera dei deputati, and the Romanian Senate. Moreover, 
according to a COSAC questionnaire, in Poland and Sweden this kind of parliamentary action could be 
incompatible with their constitutional framework. 
were not met by any significant reaction from European institutions. Whereas a significant 
minority of NPs have shown great enthusiasm for this instrument, Boronska-Hryniewiecka’s 
clear analysis presents it as an ambiguous tool for parliamentary politics. In particular, the 
green card might be perceived by the EP as endangering its institutional position because it 
would grant the NPs an indirect legislative initiative.12 In light of the legal and political 
hurdles surrounding this instrument, her main suggestion is to turn the green card in an 
instrument for joint-amendment action. While initially limited in scope, this reform might 
have some potential on the basis of the possibility that interparliamentary cooperation, 
through learning and adjustment, would realistically pave the way in the future for a more 
assertive approach by NPs.  
 
 
Conclusion  
 
What is the political condition of NPs in the EU after the Lisbon Treaty and the Euro crisis? 
These three volumes all point to a particular dynamic: it has taken time for NPs to 
understand, first, how the new instruments introduced by the Lisbon Treaty could be 
employed and how to contain, after the Euro crisis, the expansion of the new 
intergovernmentalism. Common to all three books are the ideas that (1) at least the 
communication and the scrutiny functions have mostly been enhanced, while the others 
have on average suffered, and (2) that often these progresses have taken place in a very 
uneven manner, that is, more in some NPs than others. However, whether this will be 
enough to avoid further weakening of the role of NPs in EU policy making is far from certain. 
                                                     
12 In a comparative chapter of the volume edited by Jancic, Katarzyna Granat looks at the way in which the 
competition between the federal and the State level has been managed in Switzerland and the US, trying to 
extract some of their practices to be applied to the EU and the role of the NPs as the political safeguards of 
federalism. 
